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ANTITRUST IRRELEVANCE IN AIR





TO SOME airline analysts it may seem that the failure of
airline deregulatory policy and the subsequent consoli-
dation of the airline industry into an oligopoly has en-
hanced the need for effective antitrust enforcement. This
article suggests otherwise. In oligopoly markets, price
and output decisions are made while anticipating the reac-
tions of rivals.' This interdependency means that oligo-
polistic firms will not reduce prices to increase sales
because, as others will match the price, such action is
fruitless. Restated, prices in an oligopoly tend only to
rise, ostensibly above marginal cost, and "competition".is
achieved through alternative means of production and
marketing (or "nonprice competition"). Consequently,
the existence of only a few large scale competitors serves
* Associate Professor of Aerospace Technology at Arizona State University,
B.A., Upper Iowa University, 1976, M.P.A., University of San Francisco, 1982,
Ph.D., Arizona State University, 1990.
** Regent's Professor of Business Administration at Arizona State University,
B.A., University of Montana, 1949, M.A., 1950, Ph.D., The Ohio State University,
1957.
F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
134-35 (1970). Conversely, monopolies have no rivals and therefore may price
unchallenged above marginal cost. E. GELLHORN, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOM-
ics, 73-74 (1981). It follows that predatory behavior is free to roam in monopoly
markets.
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as a check on predatory behavior.2 Antitrust law is there-
fore irrelevant in an oligopolistic market because interde-
pendent sellers3 cannot engage in the type of predatory
pricing of a monopolist. What is needed instead is new
adaptive law to protect the consumer from unfair price
discrimination.
II. EVOLUTION OF ANTITRUST LAW
Economic concentration evolved in the late nineteenth
century as a "rational" mechanism against excess compe-
tition in the marketplace.' At its root was a desire to es-
cape the rigors and uncertainties of competition and to
rectify a market that business leaders could not otherwise
control. Corporate growth was an attempt to stabilize and
integrate the economy in such a way that would allow cor-
porations "to function in a predictable and secure envi-
ronment permitting reasonable profits over the long
run."5
2 Oligopoly does not, however, serve as a check on pricing above marginal out-
put. This high pricing is only compounded when competitors are able to share
information. In the airline industry today, for example, pricing information is in-
stantly shared through computer reservation networks, the use of which seems
tantamount to price setting. L. GESELL, AIRLINE RE-REGULATION 67 (1990).
3 E. GELLHORN, supra note 1, at 73.
4 See M. WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 186,
333-34 (1947) [hereinafter M. WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL]; M. WEBER, ECON-
OMY AND SOCIETY 85-86 (1978) [hereinafter M. WEBER, ECONOMY]; see also Gid-
dens, Introduction M. WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF
CAPITALISM at 25 (1958); J. INVERARITY, P. LAUDERDALE & B. FELD, LAW AND SOCI-
ETY: SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CRIMINAL LAW 104 (1983) [hereinafter IN-
VERARITY]. In Weber's perspective on capitalism (and the modern institutional
order), the free market economy is dependent upon rational-legal authority, not
only internal to the organization in its "bureaucracy," but also externally, upon
the "rationality of economic action." As Anthony Giddens interprets Weber,
"[M]odern rational capitalism has need, not only for the technical means of pro-
duction, but of a calculable legal system and administration in terms of formal
rules." INVERVARITY, supra, at 104. By "rational," Weber was referring to market-
place efficiency; the most rational means of orienting economic activity. As Inver-
arity explains, rationality does not mean "reasonable" in the colloquial sense, but
rather, is used in the technical sense to mean rules and procedures. Id. See M.
WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL, supra, at 333. M. WEBER, ECONOMY, supra, at 85-
86.
G. KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM 3 (1963), quoted in INVERARITY,
supra note 4, at 223-25.
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As it turned out, the anti-competitive tactics of the giant
national corporations, coupled with their sheer size, cre-
ated as many political and legal problems as the economic
problems they solved. The behavior of the railroad com-
panies, in particular, became a test of Adam Smith's lais-
sez-faire philosophy.6 Lacking competition, the railroads
set rates as they pleased, thus discriminating particularly
against farmers as a group. Reaction to the railroads'
price discrimination became the basis for the consumer
revolt by the National Grange, an agrarian society formed
in 1867. The Granger movement of the 1870's demanded
state regulation of railroads, grain elevators and public
warehouses. As a result of this movement, Congress
passed the Act to Regulate Commerce in 1887, followed
by a subsequent string of economic regulatory laws (in-
cluding the "antitrust laws") during the Progressive Era
and beyond.
The Granger movement is of significance in the evolu-
tion of government regulation because it was the first time
that American society regulated an industry by setting up
a regulatory structure outside of the courts and the com-
mon law." The discriminatory rate practices of the rail-
roads were specifically targeted by this movement.
Unfortunately, early in the evolution of regulatory law,
the focus shifted from the "behavior" of the industry,
manifested as discriminatory pricing and other abuses, to
concerns about size and corporate (monopolistic) "struc-
ture." Originally, it was assumed that a direct causal link
existed between monopoly and consumer abuse, but this
is not necessarily true.
Nevertheless, monopolistic abuses by 1872 were a na-
tionwide problem, and a special committee was estab-
lished in the United States Senate to study the issue. 9 The
6 L. GERTSON, C. FRALEIGH & R. SCHWAB, THE DEREGULATED SOCIETY 23 (1988)
[hereinafter GERSTON].
7 R. ROBERTSON, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 283 (1973).
8 R. SAMPSON, M. FARRIS & D. SHROCK, DOMESTIC TRANSPORTATION PRACTICE,
THEORY AND POLICY 212-13 (1990) [hereinafter SAMPSON].
9 Id. at 214.
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product of the Senate Committee was the Wifidom Re-
port "' which concluded that the railroads were, indeed,
imposing unfair discrimination and extracting extortion-
ate charges. It is of note that the focus of the Windom
Report was upon the "effects" of consumer abuse rather
than its supposed "structural" causes. Still, the Windom
Report did recognize that although the "invisible hand"
of competition" might be the ideal regulator, private
competition, the Report said, "invariably ends in
combination."' 2
To address the sort of widespread price discrimination
uncovered by the Windom Report, the Senate and the
House of Representatives separately drew up their own
versions of regulatory bills.' 3 The two houses became
deadlocked, however, over their different approaches to
the issue. To break the impasse, another special commit-
tee, the Cullom Committee, was appointed to investigate
the railroad problem.' 4 In 1886, the Cullom Committee
reported the existence of discriminatory abuses by the
railroads, emphasizing not consumer rights and the ef-
fects of the abuses, but the assumption that the abuses re-
sulted from monopoly power. The Report altered the
course of regulatory social control by shifting the focus
from the individual victim of discrimination and other
consumer abuses to concerns about controlling what the
committee viewed as the fundamental structural cause of
the abuse - monopolistic concentration.' 5
III. THE CONSUMER IDEAL
"Consumer-oriented" regulation was the idealism of
legislation adopted during the Progressive Era. During
this time, the government, through its administrative
lo Id. at 10.
,, See generally A. SMIH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS (R. Canaan rev. ed. 1937).
12 Sampson, supra note 9, at 214.
-s Id. at 10.
,4 Id. at 215.
15 Id.
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powers, began increasingly to regulate and "control"
business organization and the consumption of commodi-
ties. 16 Rather than attempting to protect the consumer at
the individual level, government intervention sought to
stabilize the economy (and business) against "cutthroat"
competition 7 and the "evils" of monopoly. The shift
from behavioral to structural control masked the funda-
mental ideology of consumer protection.
Social control at the organizational level, if it could be
compared with economic theory, is analogous to "supply
side economics," which attempts to encourage capital in-
vestment (traditionally through tax incentives), with the
expectation that in turn jobs might be created and indi-
vidual spending might expand the economy.'" The objec-
tive of antitrust law is to assure a "competitive" economy,
based upon the belief that through competition individual
consumer wants will be satisfied at the lowest (i.e., eco-
nomically efficient) price.' 9 However, a "competitive" air-
line market (meaning a laissez-faire market with many
competitors) no longer exists. 20 Nevertheless, and irre-
spective of the market concentration that has already oc-
curred, it should be recognized that choices other than
reliance upon a competitive economy to protect consumer
welfare are still available.
IV. GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY COLLUSION
Unfortunately, government regulation has at times
been at the behest of and in close cooperation with big
business. 2' Antitrust law, for example, transformed into
administrative law by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,22
16 INVERARITY, supra note 4, at 164.
17 Id. at 233-34, 237.
as M. FARRIS & S. HAPPEL, MODERN MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS 10-12 (1987)
[hereinafter M. FARRIS].
19 E. GELLHORN, supra note 1, at 40-41.
-o L. GESELL, supra note 2, at 42-50.
2 Pillai, The CAB on Travel Regulation, in THE MONOPOLY MAKERS, 160-66 (M.
Green ed. 1973).
22 Pub. L. No. 89-796, 72 Stat. 731.
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is designed to protect the airlines, not the consumer." In
fact, consumers have been denied standing to file com-
plaints or to participate in enforcement proceedings.2 4
Similarly, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) was created
for the airlines to address an overly competitive market.
The CAB, while possessing enormous powers over air
transportation to protect the public's right to travel, func-
tioned instead to rationalize the marketplace for industry.
By the 1970's, deregulation proponents perceived that,
rather than protecting the consumer, an "imperfect car-
tel" had been created to satisfy the air carriers, even to
the detriment of the travelling public.2 5 Ironically, gov-
ernmental regulation served to collude industry with
government.26
The Progressive Era was indeed marked by hegemony
that effectively muted any articulation of "real" consumer
interests.2 7 "Hegemony" exists when the working class in
advanced capitalistic society believes that the ruling class
interest is the same as the interest of the larger society. 28
The hegemony of the Progressive Era is perhaps best ex-
pressed in the "trickle down" economic theories of An-
drew Mellon who said: "[t]he property of the middle and
lower classes depends upon the good fortunes and the
light taxes of the rich." 29 Ultimately, "competitive capi-
talism" was transformed into "corporate capitalism," and
the laissez-faire economic marketplace envisioned by
21 Regulatory Reform in Air Transportation: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Aviation of
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 404
(1977) (statement of Ralph Nader, consumer advocate) [hereinafter Nader].
24 Wolfe v. Trans. World Airlines, 544 F.2d 134, 136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 248 (1976); Polansky v. Trans World Airlines, 523 F.2d 332, 337 (3d Cir.
1975); cf. Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, 512 F.2d 527, 542-43 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
rev'd on other grounds, 426 U.S. 290 (1976).
25 Pillai, supra note 22, at 160.
26 Fellmeth, The Regulatory-Industrial Complex, in THE CONSUMER AND CORPORATE
ACCOUNTABILITY 218 (R. Nader ed. 1973).
27 M. NADEL, THE POLITICS OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 16 (1971).
28 A. GRAMsCi, SELECTION FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS 12 (1961); see also Lau-
derdale, A Power and Process Approach to the Definition of Deviance, in A PoLrr-
ICAL ANALYSIS OF DEVIANCE 9 (P. Lauderdale ed. 1980).
29 L. LOENIG, THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE 269 (1981).
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Adam Smith was replaced by imperfect competition and
the concentration of capital into fewer and fewer compa-
nies in any given market.30
V. THE REGULATORY IDEAL
There is an obvious tension between the ideals of com-
petitive capitalism and corporate capitalism. The former
model promotes the individual economic freedom of the
consumer by providing him with many competing suppli-
ers and thereby ensuring that price is determined by sup-
ply and demand, rather than the marginal cost of the
sellers.3 ' Corporate capitalism, on the other hand, is
founded on the concept of rugged individualism which
often leads to the submersion of the individual in the col-
lectivism of economic concentration.3 2
Regulatory policy has historically vacillated from one
regulatory ideal to the other.33 Until the 1960's most reg-
ulation was directed toward control of the economy. 4
From the mid 1960's to the mid 1970's, however, the fo-
cus shifted to "social regulation," providing increased
protection for the environment, the consumer, and the
worker. 5 Social regulation "represented a fundamental
shift in priorities from narrow oversight of selected indus-
tries to broad control over basic objectives, and from con-
cern with efficient production to promotion of the public
good."' 36 Social regulation then proceeded to a third reg-
ulatory ideal, resistance.3 7 Business people and econo-
mists attributed this third regulatory ideal to be the cause
of the economic slump of the late seventies. Deregulatory
o INVERARITY, supra note 4, at 169-70.
3, H. WELLS, MONOPOLY AND SOCIAL CONTROL 149 (1952).
3 Id. at 151.
33 L. GESELL, supra note 2, at 13-15.
- GERSTON, supra note 7, at 27; see also, S. TOLCHIN & M. TOLCHIN, DISrN-
TLING AMERICA: THE RUSH TO DEREGULATE (1983); L. GESELL, supra note 2, at
139-43.
35 Gerston, supra note 7, at 32. Some theorists have referred to this period as
the "New" Progressive Era.
36 Id.
"7 Id. at 35-36.
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policies were employed to remedy the sluggishness."8
The resulting deregulation mania plagued the eighties as
well.
Currently, the "pendulum" is moving back toward
some form of re-regulation, particularly of the airlines.
The structural model in Figure 1, described as a "syner-
gistic loop," in which the wisdom and experience gained
from the past regulation of the market serve to educate
Congress for future control over the aviation industry.
The air transportation market begins in competitive capi-
talism; is rationalized by industry into the corporate capi-
talism of the Progressive Era; is re-rationalized by the
government through economic regulation into corporate
capitalism in the form of a public utility (and monitored
by the CAB); is then deconstructed by government dereg-
ulation in hopes of returning to a form of competitive cap-
italism; is then re-rationalized into corporate capitalism
once again by finance entrepreneurs; and finally, is left
dangling with Congress in the process of looking for ways
of deconstructing the latest form of corporate
capitalism. 9
The synergistic loop of Figure 1 may be used to explain
social evolutionary patterns and to predict the new wave
of regulation. In stating that the airline industry ought to
be re-regulated, the new regulatory model ought to con-
form to the pattern of the synergistic loop, which departs
from one concept of regulation to another in favor of a
new social regulatory model (see Figure 2). Rather than
trying once again to regulate the industry by centralizing
the absolute character of the regulatory process, more ef-
ficient regulation might flow from a more "natural" pro-
cess of social control.
As Alfred Kahn concedes, the brand of deregulation he
originally supported must undergo re-regulatory reform
through the intervention of competition supplementing
38 Id. "Unreasonableness" and "cost" became the rallying cries for business
leaders opposed to social regulation.












































functions by the government.4 ° In stating that the airlines
ought to be re-regulated, it may seem that the industry
would be taken full circle from regulation to deregulation
and back again to regulation. Mr. Kahn, however, points
out that "the proper metaphor is not a full circle, which
would take us back to where we started, but to a spiral
which takes lessons learned from the past and gives them
new direction." 4 '
VI. CORPORATE STRUCTURE VERSUS BEHAVIOR
The synergistic model of regulatory reform might also
be useful in predicting a revised model of antitrust law.
Just as tension between competitive and corporate forms
4 A. Kahn, Deregulation: Looking Backward and Looking Forward, Paper presented
at the Fiftieth Anniversary Session of American Economic Association/Transpor-
tation and Public Utilities Group (Dec. 28, 1989).
4' Id. Restated, we must learn from our former mistakes. Such a view clarifies
the meaning of synergistic loops.
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of capitalism has existed, there has equally been a long-
standing disagreement between "structuralists" and
"realists" over the effect of corporate size.42 In the struc-
turalist view, large corporate size automatically spells un-
due power.43 This same perspective is applicable to high
concentration as well, simply because it predisposes the
"ability" to abuse the marketplace.4 4
Section 4 of the Sherman Act provided the remedy of
either divestiture, dissolution, or divorcement to relieve
the consumer from the noncompetitive situation of a con-
centrated market.45 This structural relief, however, has
not been effective.46
To realists, size and concentration alone are insufficient
tests of whether or not corporate activities are competi-
tive. It is the actual "behavior" of the corporation rather
than its size which determines market competitiveness.47
The solution, then, is to impose behavorial remedies such
as reducing barriers to entry and the threat of retalia-
tion.4s The position of U.S. courts on this issue has gone
through a complete cycle: from a behavioral interpreta-
tion to a structural one and back. The evidence which fol-
lows provides credence to the behavioral approach.
In at least one industry, the airlines, sufficient data ex-
ists to empirically test the relationship between concentra-
tion and its impact upon consumer welfare. In the first
decade of airline deregulation, federal deregulatory policy
has taken the airlines from a highly concentrated industry,
moved it in the direction of the competitive capitalistic
ideal by encouraging entry by new airlines, and then al-
lowed even greater concentration to occur than before
deregulation.
42 Bock, Consistency and Change in Antitrust in the United States: An Introduction, in
TOWARD A NATIONAL ANTITRUST PoLicy 39, 41 (1976).
43 Id.
44 Id.
4' D. WALDMAN, ANTITRUST ACTION AND MARKET STRUCTURE 1 (1978).
46 Id.
47 Id. at 21.
48 Id.
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Functioning within the free enterprise paradigm, 49 the
Department of Transportation adopted a policy for ease
of entry as a key factor in its analyses of potential anti-
competitive effects in merger cases. Between 1985 and
1987, DOT approved 25 mergers with remarkably few re-
strictions. Critics charged that DOT had taken an "any-
thing goes" approach to airline mergers. The result by
1987 was to effectively reconcentrate the industry to pre-
deregulation levels.
By December 1986 the airline industry market share,
measured in revenue passenger miles (RPM), indicated
that the top four airlines (United, American, Eastern and
Delta) shared just under fifty percent (48.3%) of the do-
mestic market.50 With the continuation of airline mergers
in the first five months of 1987, the top four airlines
(Texas Air/Continental/Eastern, United/Pan American
Pacific, American/Air Cal, and Delta/Western) shared
61.2% of the market. At year's end, there were 31 sched-
uled air carriers serving the domestic market. Of those 31
carriers, 10 had cornered 88.2% of the market.5' En-
planement data for the subsequent year reflected a similar
pattern, although individual market shares had shifted
among carriers, with the smaller carriers showing slightly
increased shares, and the total for the top ten domestic
4 The Free Enterprise paradigm is explored in Berman, Consumerism and the
Regulatory System: Paradigms of Reform, 1 POL'Y STUD. REV. 454 (1981-82). Berman
describes the free enterprise paradigm as a system which most of the contempo-
rary business community identifies with Adam Smith and the laissez-faire market
place. Id. In a continuum of consumer interests, the free enterprise paradigm is
at one extreme. It assumes that there should be little, or no, intervention in the
marketplace by government-that consumers are individuals responsible for their
own actions. It is a market place where risk is assumed and where a "caveat
emptor" attitude might prevail. Id. It is a marketplace advocated by the liberta-
rian perspective, where individuals should be at liberty to conduct business with-
out government intervention and where the consumer, as an individual, should be
held responsible for his or her own market decisions. Id. It is a marketplace
where the capitalist has no social responsibilities, only the responsibility to make
money. See also M. Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Prof-
its, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN BUSINESS: A PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH 191 (T. Donald-
son & P. Werhane eds. 1979).
'o L. GESELL, supra note 2, at 39-41.
I /d.
scheduled air carriers increasing to more than 90%.52
The bottom line is that the airline industry has become
an oligopoly. No longer subject to meaningful competi-
tion, the industry has managed to control (i.e., rationalize)
the market, and therefore, is not required to push for
higher profits through increased load factors. In fact,
"high load factors to offset cost reductions no longer have
the same importance to airlines where their ability to es-
tablish prices well above marginal costs can easily gener-
ate revenue sufficient to gain high returns. ' 5 3
In the "structuralist" perspective, the industry has re-
turned to oligopoly. Airlines may now raise their fares
relatively uncontested, especially at hubs where they are
dominant. "Pricing behavior, once mandated and con-
trolled by the CAB, has been replaced with price rigidity
similar to that of the regulated era." 54 Thus, "[A]ir travel-
lers can (or ought to) expect higher fares as the big fish in
the airline industry keep gobbling up the little ones." 55
VII. CONSUMER WELFARE
By 1988 (when the market had been effectively concen-
trated into oligopoly), fares had increased significantly.56
Although this might seem to validate structuralist con-
cerns that a few competitors can price gouge, it is not nec-
essarily size, per se, that negatively impacts welfare
interest. The significant increase in the airline price struc-
ture may well have been justified by economic reality.
While consumer welfare, in terms of paying higher fares,
may have been adversely affected, price increase alone
does not constitute "unfair" treatment. On the other
hand, price discrimination does treat the consumer
unfairly.
52 Id.
53 E. Harraf & B. Cheek, Deregulation - Oligopoly to Oligopoly, (paper presented at
the Airshow Canada Symposium (Aug. 8, 1989) (unpublished).
5 Id.
21 Koten, Increased Flights, Fewer Flights Are Likely Results of Airline Mergers, Wall St.
J., Sept. 17, 1986, at 31, col. 3.
. L. GESELL, supra note 2, at 39-40.
1991) ANTITRUST 185
186 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [57
Through a quasi-experimental design, it may be
demonstrated that it is not size but behavior which affects
consumer interest. And, if it is the relative deprivation
caused by price discrimination that causes the consumer
to be treated unfairly, then it would seem that something
ought to be done to correct corporate decision-making
and pricing strategies, as opposed to enforcement of anti-
trust laws which attempt to correct monopolistic
"tendencies.15 7
Part of the strategy to control the airlines has been to
require a standard system of accounting so that business
activities could be more closely monitored. Certificated
air carriers are required by law to maintain records and to
report to the Department of Transportation on a regular
basis memoranda of the movement of traffic and of re-
ceipts and expenditures of money.58 The prescribed for-
mat for airline accounting systems is the Uniform System
of Accounting and Reporting, commonly referred to as
"Form 41 Reports." 59 The federal government compiles
the results of the Form 41 Reports and publishes them as
a matter of public record. For this study, air carrier
records were surveyed, compiled into a standard useable
form, and then coded for entry onto a data base. Airline
performance data were extracted from Federal records
stored on microfiche published in the American Statistical
Index for the years 1978 to 1988. These data included
consumer complaint statistics, denied boardings, and pas-
senger enplanement information.60 For the test of size
57 M. PASTIN, THE HARD PROBLEMS OF MANAGEMENT: GAINING THE ETHics EDGE
(1986) (Pastin suggests that although ethics has many meanings, good ethics is a
matter of making right decisions. It follows, then, that the intent of law ought to
be the encouragement of good decision-making).
49 U.S.C. § 407(a), (d) (1988).
5 L. GESELL, supra note 2, at 88.
o Air carrier operations may vary from one company to the next, and the break
between National and Regional categories is marked by dissimilar aircraft, route
structures, size of operations and reporting of information. In order to consist-
ently test the effect of corporate size upon consumer welfare, data was collected
only for passenger carriers categorized as Majors or Nationals (or those which
became major carriers after deregulation). Inasmuch as the domestic data alone
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versus behavior, complaint and denied boarding data are
assumed to represent consumer welfare interests. The
enplanement data are a measure of business volume, and
therefore reflects corporate size and/or concentration.
If, in the structuralist view, size predisposes "undue
power," one would expect to find a correlation between
the enplanement data (ENPLNMT) and both consumer
complaints (COMPLNT) and denied boardings
(DENDBD) - the latter, since one might assume there is
a causal connection between a passenger denied of his re-
served seat and then later complaining about it.61 The
correlation matrix (see Table 1) shows the relationships
between the variables. The results would seem to indicate
that concerns over size alone are unjustified. The correla-
tion between ENPLNMT and COMPLNT (-.03) is nearly
non-existent. There is a stronger relationship between
ENPLNMT and DENDBD, but it is a negative correlation
(-.24), which would indicate just the opposite of the struc-
turalist perspective. These results suggest that the
smaller the airline, the more apt it is to deny a seat to a
confirmed passenger.
From a more causal analysis (see Table 2), the regres-
sion of ENPLNMT on COMPLNT and DENDBD, the co-
efficient of determination (R2 ) is relatively weak (.11),62
which suggests that size, per se, does not necessarily re-
sult in consumer abuse.63 Restated, there is no correla-
tion between airline size and consumer welfare.
were analyzed, the results relative to concentration and market share may differ
from analyses reported by other airline analysts using more inclusive information.
61 See e.g., Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, 626 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
62 See G. BOHRNSTEDT & D. KNOKE, STATISTICS FOR SOCIAL DATA ANALYSIS 104-
06 (1982) (Although the coefficient of determination is relatively weak, it is signifi-
cant at the 95% confidence level. For the regression analysis, the probability level
(alpha) for rejection of the null hypothesis is conventionally set at .05 to reduce
the probability of making a false rejection error by setting alpha at the very low
level such as .001).
63 L. GESELL, supra note 2, at 252-59 (complete list of airline data).
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COMPLNT .43 ** -. 03
DENDBD -. 24 *
N of cases: 272 1-tailed significance: * = .001
Where,
COMPLNT = Consumer Complaints
DENDBD = Denied Boardings




COMPLNT .33 * .05
DENDBD -. 32 *
R2  .30 * .11*
N of cases: 272 * - significant at .05
Where,
COMPLNT = Consumer Complaints
DENDBD = Denied Boardings
ENPLNMT = Passenger Emplanements
Nevertheless, the structuralist might still
does presuppose the ability to abuse






Price discrimination occurs when a firm charges two or
more different prices for essentially the same product "for
reasons other than cost differences. '"6 There are three
conditions necessary for price discrimination to occur: the
firm must possess some degree of monopoly power; the
- M. FARRIS, supra note 19, at 289-90.
firm must also be able to segregate or classify its custom-
ers into groups with different price elasticities; and, it
must be able to prevent resale from one segment of the
market to another (i.e., arbitrage).65
Price discrimination in American society is common,
and from a purely economic standpoint may be neither
good nor bad, but merely a description of a price action.
From a legal perspective, however, "discrimination" is the
act of treating one differently from another;66 that is, the
act of unfairly, injuriously, and prejudicially distinguish-
ing between persons or objects, where "economically" a
sound and "fair" distinction does not exist.67 "Discrimi-
nation" also means an arbitrary imposition of unequal tar-
iffs for substantially the same service.68  For our
purposes, a carrier's failure to treat all alike under sub-
stantially similar conditions constitutes "unjust"
discrimination.6 9
Irrespective of precedents describing price discrimina-
tion as unfair or injurious, it may not be considered illegal
under the antitrust laws unless there is an attempt to mo-
nopolize. 70 Furthermore, an attempted monopolization
claim is encumbered by having to show: (1) a specific in-
tent to monopolize a relevant market, (2) predatory or
65 Id.
Wimberly v. Georgia S. & Florida Ry. Co., 5 Ga. App. 263, 63 S.E. 29, 31
(1908).
67 Morton Salt Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 162 F.2d 949, 954-95 (7th Cir.
1947); see also Atlantic Pipe Line Co. v. Brown County, 12 F. Supp. 642, 646 (N.D.
Tex. 1939).
In re Public Util. Comm'n, 268 P.2d 605, 616 (Or. 1954).
Kentucky Traction and Terminal Co. v. Murray, 176 Ky. 593, 195 S.W. 1119,
1121 (1917).
70 Morton Salt, 162 F.2d at 954-55.
'[D]iscrimination' within the meaning of the Clayton Act is not sy-
nonymous with harmless 'price differentiation'.... It is the act of
unfairly, injuriously and prejudicially distinguishing between per-
sons or objects, where economically speaking a sound fair distinc-
tion does not exist. It occurs as a matter of law only when section
2(a) of the Clayton Act ... is in fact violated.
Id. Price discrimination may violate antitrust law if its effects may be "substan-
tially to lessen competition or tend to create monopoly." Id. at 959 (. Minton,
dissenting).
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anticompetitive conduct, and (3) a dangerous probability
of success.71
There have been major difficulties in interpreting what
constitutes price discrimination and whether competition
was being lessened. Within the Clayton Act, price dis-
crimination is not synonymous with "harmless differentia-
tion," which arises from cost differences or price
differences offered to the consumer in good faith to meet
competition.
The fact that price discrimination is against the law only
if it may substantially "lessen competition or tencbto cre-
ate a monopoly' 7 3 seems to be a fluke of legal evolution
stemming from the interpretation of corporate abuse by
the Cullom Committee. The Cullom Report, coupled
with the results of Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Illi-
nois," in which the Supreme Court held that the federal
government alone had the power to regulate interstate
commerce, led to passage of the Act to Regulate Com-
merce of 1887 (the Interstate Commerce Act)76 which at-
tempted to curb "monopoly", not rectify consumer abuse.
Claims of unfair price discrimination have long been
unheeded by the courts because the typical corporate
plaintiff could rarely demonstrate that there had been an
attempt to monopolize. Moreover, individual consumers
are denied standing altogether.77 The difficulty in inter-
preting antitrust violations, coupled with the historical
masking of consumer rights, indicates a need for revised
antitrust legislation.
71 Catlin v. Washington Energy Co., 791 F.2d 1343, 1348 (9th Cir. 1986); In re
Passenger Computer Reservation Sys. Antitrust Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1443, 1468
(C.D. Cal. 1988).
72 M. FARRIS, supra note 19, at 311.
75 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1988).
74 See supra note 15-16 and accompanying text.
75 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
76 49 U.S.C. § 10101 (1988).
77 See supra note 25, and accompanying text.
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IX. ANTITRUST REFORM
Just as the construct of the "synergistic loop" was used
to describe a potential (economic) re-regulatory model, it
might be used here to predict a new form of antitrust leg-
islation. In adopting the Sherman and Clayton Acts, Con-
gress ostensibly intended to protect the consumer. The
focus of the antitrust laws, however, has primarily been
"structural," in that it attempted to correct abuses by
prohibiting monopoly through the remedies of divesti-
ture, divorcement or dissolution. The "structural" les-
sons learned ought to be pulled back through the original
"behavioral" intent, and then re-defined as "anti-discrimi-
nation" law, in which the claims by individual consumers
of "unfair" and "injurious" price discrimination might be
addressed.78
One could argue that the original position of the syner-
gistic model is Adam Smith's ideal of American capital-
ism: a balance among the marketplace forces of capital,
labor and the consumer 79 (see Figure 3). Smith best ex-
pressed the synergistic ideal in stating that, "by pursuing
his own interest he (the individual) frequently promotes
that of society more effectually than when he really in-
tends to promote it."80
This is also the underlying construct of the model de-
scribed above as "social regulation.""' It is individual ac-
tion which results in collective social control. It is the
motivation which calls for a restatement of an antitrust
law that is currently designed to protect the corporate en-
tity, to re-define the law as "anti-discriminatory," and to
provide the individual consumer with "access to the
law" 8 2 - with "standing. '83
78 Nader, supra note 24, at 402. (Nader has suggested the creation of something
like an "Office of Airline Public Counsel" to represent consumer interests).
79 A. SMITH, supra note 12, at 56-62.
:0 Id. at 58.
,' L. GESELL, supra note 2, at 134-39.
12 L. NADER, No ACCESS TO LAw: ALTERNATIVES TO THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL SYS-
TEM 3-49 (1980).
81 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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Adam Smith's philosophy epitomizes the ideology of in-
dividualism and the free market.84 Even so, Adam Smith
stated that government has the obligation of "protecting,
as far as possible, every member of the society from the
injustice of oppression of every other member of it. ' 85 In
fact, in The Wealth of Nations, "Smith accused the business
community of seeking to monopolize trade, inevitably
conspire against the public, and direct the state in policies
that serve their interests in conflict with the public
good."' 86 Although Adam Smith proposed a system of rel-
atively unrestricted competition, he was not against mean-
ingful regulation.
The antitrust laws evolved in response to an imbalance
within the marketplace, to violations of consumer sover-
eignty in Adam Smith's ideal, and to the consumer protec-
84 INVERARITY, supra note 4, at 69.
85 A. SMITH, supra note 12, at 669.
86 A. STONE, REGULATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 44 (1982).
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tion ideology of the Progressive Era. However, the
antitrust laws were misguided by a focus upon corporate
structure.8 7 Definition and interpretation have been diffi-
cult because of the sometimes inconsistent and often un-
predictable models of economic theory. 8 Hence, in
practice the antitrust laws have become nearly unenforce-
able. Revised legislation is therefore needed.
There are essentially three devices used in regulation:
control of entry, control of service, and control of earn-
ings/price.8 9 The realities of corporate capitalism in the
modern economic world, together with lessons learned
from regulation and deregulation preclude controls over
entry. Minimum levels of service, however, might be
guaranteed through an altogether new "social regulatory"
model that is conceptually grounded in the evolution of
strict liability, modelled after worker's compensation, and
undergirded by law that moves from the repressive to the
restitutive.90
In addition to regulation of the levels of service, the
synergistic model presented in this article suggests that
consideration might be given to the introduction of price
controls into the social regulatory model as well. Such
was the original behavorial approach in the 1872 Windom
Report. 9' At a minimum, price oversight with the power
to regulate where there is "unfair" or "injurious" price
discrimination should be imposed. Further, where pre-
vailing air fares might exceed reasonable industrywide pa-
rameters, a clear definition of prohibitory consumer price
discrimination and permissible price differentiation is
needed.
X. ANTITRUST OVERSIGHT
Economists seem generally to agree that concentration
87 See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
- M. FARRIS, supra note 19, at 353.
89 Id. at 366-70.
9 L. GESELL, supra note 2, at 140.
91 See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
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is the "natural" result of competition.92 Nevertheless,
government and academics have underestimated indus-
try's ability and resolve to control its economic environ-
ment.93 The outcome of deregulatory policy has been
greater concentration than previously experienced,94 and
unfortunately, the concentration process is not over in
spite of government promises of antitrust oversight.
Under the provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Board
Sunset Act of 1984, the authority to review airline merg-
ers "cease(d) to be in effect" on January 1, 1989.9 The
Department of Transportation's authority to review merg-
ers under section 408 of the Federal Aviation Act of
195896 did not transfer 408 authority to the Department
of Justice or any other agency. Accordingly, the primary
effect of the Sunset Act was to eliminate administrative
approval of airline mergers.97 Oversight authority over
airline mergers is now vested with the Department of Jus-
tice Antitrust Division's investigative powers under the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act9" and under the Civil Investigative
Demand provision of the Antitrust Civil Process Act.99
Shortly after the Department of Justice assumed its new
found authority over airline mergers, Charles Rule, the
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Divi-
sion, gave assurances that whenever the Division was to
hear of antitrust allegations it would "bring its full crimi-
nal investigatory arsenal to bear."' 0 0  He stated that
92 See E. GELLHORN, supra note 1, at 19.
93 L. GESELL, supra note 2, at 120; see generally Levine, Airline Competition in Deregu-
lated Markets: Theoy, Firm Strategy, and Public Polity, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 393 (1987).
- L. GESELL, supra note 2, at 54-60, 120.
o' 49 U.S.C. app. § 1551(a)(7) (1988) (discussing airline mergers).
P. BARLOW, AvIATION ANTITRUST: THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF
THE UNITED STATES ANTITRUST AND INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION 34-36
(1988) (discussing airline mergers).
97 Id. at 35. This is the logical conclusion after the termination of the Depart-
ment of Transportation's authority under Section 408.
- 15 U.S.C. § 1311 (1988).
15 U.S.C. § 1312 (1988).
- The Justice Department was reportedly investigating "price signalling,"
which, in turn, gave rise to a consolidated civil lawsuit against seven major air
carriers and the Airline Tariff Publishing Co., the electronic clearing house for
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"[r]egardless of the nature of the particular airline merg-
ers that are produced in the future ... the Antitrust Divi-
sion could be counted on to examine each and every
airline transaction."'' 0 Doubt remains, however, as to
what the division could accomplish since the antitrust laws
are no longer effectual - particularly against the type of
airline mergers which remain. The present trend in the
airline industry and state of the economy are likely to ag-
gravate this antitrust problem.
Concerns of industry analysts and of Congress have in-
deed pointed to the potential dangers of the high operat-
ing ratios that are the result of excessive debt, which in
particular have resulted from leveraged buyouts, and
which have financially weakened a number of the major
airlines. The imminent threat of recession beginning in
1990 and rising fuel costs associated with the Persian Gulf
crisis have caused severe economic downturn in air
transportation.
Innovative management at the stronger airlines, having
a compulsion to control the marketplace to its own advan-
tage, should be expected to take advantage of the de-
pressed economic situation and potentially to exploit the
weaker carriers.' 0 2 However, the exploitation will proba-
bly not occur in traditional antitrust fashion. More likely,
it will be masked as "survival" tactics to combat the eco-
nomic threat of recession and rising costs.
As the weaker airlines begin to fail and strategize their
own survival through cannibalization and the sale of valu-
tariff information. See Ott, Civil Suit Filed in Wake of Federal Pricing Probe, Av. WK. &
SPACE TECH., Nov. 12, 1990, at 32. U.S. officials, however, said that investigators
would be "hard-pressed to determine whether fares [were] competitive, retalia-
tory or predatory." Id. Legal analysts were seemingly of the consensus that the
Justice Department was unlikely to move toward a conviction, and the "current
judicial climate is fairly resistant to innovative theories of antitrust" in civil suits.
Id.
101 Rule, Antitrust and Airline Mergers: A New Era, 57 TR ANSP. PRtC. J. 66, 74
(1989).
0- See, e.g., Continental Airlines Discusses Sale of Some Pacific Routes, Av. WK. & SPACE
TECH., Nov. 19, 1990, at 32 (an American Airlines official stated that American is
"an acquirer of assets, and if someone offers us something, we're interested").
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able assets, °3 the stronger carriers can be expected to
pick up the pieces. In this scenario the Antitrust Division
will be powerless, and may even support proposed merg-
ers and acquisitions under the "failing company doctrine"
as it did in the Muse Air/Southwest Airlines merger in
1985.104
XI. CONCLUSION
Anitrust laws are no longer efficacious, at least not in
the airline industry; but the industry has come to the ad-
vent of a re-regulatory reform movement. Included in
that reform ought to be the revision of antitrust law, to re-
define it as "antidiscrimination law," and to translate the
law into a form which more closely mirrors the social evo-
lutionary origins of antitrust law as a consumer-oriented
ideal. In short, the behavioral approach to antitrust law
originally employed by the Windom Report merits
reexamination.
Oligopoly is a modem economic reality to which regu-
lators may have to adapt. One has to wonder, however,
what the outcome might be of enhanced, clearly defined,
and more vigorously enforced antitrust law. What would
happen if General Motors, for example, were forced to
divest itself of its "competing" subsidiaries; to create an
independent Chevrolet Corporation, a Pontiac Corpora-
tion, and so forth? Or, in the airlines, if there could be
103 See, e.g., McKenna, Airline Analysts Fear Big Loss Unless Fares Meet Cost Hikes, Av.
WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 22, 1990 at 30 (Midway Airlines agreed to sell 14 land-
ing/takeoff slots at New York and Washington, D.C. to American Airlines);
Velocci, Mountain of Debt May Force Continental to Sell Assets, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH.
Oct. 29, 1990, at 26 (Financially troubled Continental Airlines reportedly would
be forced to sell valuable assets and drastically cut costs to stay in business); United
Reaches Agreement On Pan Am Route Purchase, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 19, 1990,
at 29 (Pan Am agreed to sell international routes in Europe to United Airlines);
Smith, Pan Am Stock Soars on New Icahn Bid Despite Street's Doubts It Will Succeed, Wall
St. J., Dec. 18, 1990, at 4, col. 3 (Pam Am stock surged 20% in response to a
takeover by TWA, but analysts expressed skepticism that anything would come of
TWA's overture because of the weak financial conditions of both airlines).
o' Justice Department Supports Muse, Southwest Merger, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH.,
May 27, 1985, at 33.
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another Western Airlines, and an Ozark, a Piedmont, a
Republic, a PSA?
If the synergistic model is truly reflective of reality, and
if it provides insight into forthcoming regulatory develop-
ments, then "conglomerate deconstruction" may well be
a "wave" of the distant future. But first it seems necessary
to pass through "oligopoly acceptance" before the pen-
dulum can swing back to what which might be called "di-
vestiture law."
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